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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court's judgment denying Appellant Juan Robert

Jimenez's petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.

B.

General Course of Proceedings
1.

Underlying criminal proceedings in district court

Juan Robert ("Robert"), Jorge and Jose were brothers. Robert and Jose had a tumultuous
relationship in which they disagreed about money and Robert's romantic relationship with Jose
(the third brother's) ex-girlfriend. See Trial Transcript, 1 p. 185, ln.12-25; p. 186, In. 3-21. On
February 9, 2013, Jorge became increasingly aggressive and threatened Robert's girlfriend, her
children and Robert in a voicemail left on the girlfriend's phone. See id. at p. 334, ln.3-11. After
several heated telephone conversations, Jorge told Robert he was coming over to Robert's house
and, fearing for his safety, Robert secured a gun from a friend. State v. Jimenez, 159 Idaho 466,
468, 362 P.3d 541, 543 (Ct. App. 2015).
Jorge parked his car in front of Robert's house, exited and walked around the vehicle's
rear, advancing toward Robert while aiming a gun at his head and verbally threatening him.

Jimenez, 159 Idaho at 468, 362 P.3d at 544; Trial Transcript, p. 450, ln.2 - p. 453, In. 12.
Robert told Jorge to lower his gun and fired two warning shots at the ground after Jorge failed to
comply. Jimenez, 159 Idaho at 468, 362 P.3d at 544. Jorge continued to advance as Robert
The transcript prepared in Robert's direct appeal (herein "Trial Transcript), Docket Number
42155, was admitted as Exhibit 1 in the evidentiary hearing held on Robert's post-conviction
relief application.
1
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pleaded with him to put the gun down and, as Jorge raised the raised his gun towards Robert's
head, Robert fired at Jorge's legs. Trial Transcript, p. 450, ln.15-24. As Robert called 911, Jorge
went to the driver's side of his vehicle and entered and started the vehicle. Trial Transcript, p.
460, ln.7-9. Shortly thereafter, Jorge turned off the ignition, walked to the back and sat on the
tailgate of the vehicle. Trial Transcript, p. 460, ln.12-15.
However, Jorge claimed that he had no weapons on his person but that he kept a hand
gun in the center console of his vehicle, along with his concealed weapons permit. See Plaintiff's
Exhibit 33, D71;Trial Transcript, p. 170, In. 3-13. Jorge told the responding officer that he
walked to the front of his vehicle to retrieve his cellphone after he was shot. Trial Transcript, p.
174, In. 20-23.
As one officer detained Robert at gunpoint and the other demanded to know what
occurred, Robert advised his brother had been shot by an unknown assailant in a black hoodie
and black pants who had run from the are. Ex 33, D73,75 D. 73. Robert denied Jorge's claim that
he had shot him and the officer advised Robert of his rights under Miranda and placed him in the
back of the patrol vehicle. Robert was charged with aggravated battery enhanced with the use of
a firearm in its commission, Idaho Code§§ 18-903, 18-908, 19-2520, and with unlawful
possession of a firearm with a persistent violator sentence enhancement, LC.§§ 18-3316, 192514. Jimenez, 159 Idaho at 468-69, 362 P.3d at 543--44.
During trial, Jorge claimed that he was neither angry nor arguing with Robert at the time
of the shooting, denied threatening Robert on the phone and claimed Robert started firing at him
with no exchange of words. Trial Transcript, p. 164, ln.11-12; p. 169, ln.13-14; p. 171, ln.16-19;
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p. 198, In. 20-21; p. 199, ln.10-20; p. 201, ln.1-2; p. 202, ln.1-13; p. 204, In. 22-23. Although
Jorge admitted arguing with Robert to the EMT and the emergency room physician, trial counsel
failed to refute Jorge's testimony that he was not angry or that he and Petitioner were not arguing
prior to the shooting. Exhibits 2, 6 and 7. Counsel also failed to impeach Jorge's claim he was
unarmed at the time of the shooting and always carried the handgun in vehicle pursuant to his
concealed weapons permit with evidence the officers found not evidence of any such permit.
However, Mr. Alvarado testified that he was not armed at the time of the shooting. Trial
Transcript, p. 169, ln.23 - p.170, ln.2; Exhibit 33, D70.
Robert was arrested on an unrelated incident the evening and appeared for the second day
of trial in custody and with neither sleep nor his medication. Trial Transcript, p. 238, In. 5-20; p.
239, ln.3-6; see also R. 524. The jail refused to administer the narcotic pain and anti-anxiety
medication Robert had been prescribed for over a year and, by his testimony on the third day of
trial, Robert was experiencing withdrawal including blurred vision, head and back ache, and
difficulty focusing. Trial Transcript, p. 543, ln.25 - p.544, In. 24. Finally, after he had testified
and been subject to cross-examination, Robert was given medication. Exhibit 15. The jury found
Robert guilty.
The district court sentenced Robert to a unified sentence of twenty-eight years with eight
years determinate on the aggravated battery conviction and a concurrent sentence of five years
determinate for the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction. Jimenez, 159 Idaho at 469, 362
P.3d at 544. On direct appeal, Robert argued that the district court committed fundamental error
by providing an erroneous self-defense jury instruction; that the prosecutor's misconduct during
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closing arguments constituted fundamental error; that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a new trial; and that the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

Jimenez, 159 Idaho at 469, 362 P.3d at 544. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 475, 362 P.3d
at 550.
2.

Post-conviction relief proceedings

On January 7, 2016, Robert initiated the instant post-conviction relief proceedings;
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to object or otherwise prevent
the medication situation from violating his fundamental right to testify on his own behalf. R. 1O;
11 7. Robert also alleged trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress his
statements to officers while held at gunpoint, counsel's failure to provide the discovery materials
to Robert or to use the information contained therein during trial, representing Robert while
operating under a conflict of interest. R 109-125. Robert also alleged that he was entitled to postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence - psychological examinations -which
should have presented mitigation evidence at his sentencing. R. 125.
The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing and Robert supported his petition with
the underlying trial transcript, discovery and multiple exhibits. The district court denied Robert's
petition following an evidentiary hearing. R. 517-551. Robert moved to reconsider, which the
district court also denied. R. 557-64, 575-77. This appeal follows.
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Jimenez's petition for post-conviction

relief because he established that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?
2.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Jimenez's petition for post-conviction

relief because he established that newly discovered evidence entitled him to post-conviction
relief?
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil proceeding in which the petitioner

must prove the allegations in his petition by a preponderance of evidence. LC. § 19--4907;
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2009); Keserovic v. State, 158 Idaho
234, 238, 345 P.3d 1024, 1028 (Ct. App. 2015). When reviewing a district court's decision deny a
petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing, this Court will disturb the
district court's factual findings when they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Wurdemann v.
State, 161 Idaho 713,717,390 P.3d 439,443 (2017); Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612,617,262 P.
3d 255, 260 (2011); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992).
Ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact in which this Court
defers to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and exercises
free review over the application of the relevant law to those facts. Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 71 7,
390 P.3d at 443; Booth, 151 Idaho at 617,262 P.3d at 260.
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B.

Robert Established that He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel at all critical

stages of criminal prosecutions. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). Ineffective
assistance of counsel requires a finding that (1) the attorney's performance was deficient and (2)
the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Icanovic v. State, 159 Idaho 524, 529, 363 P.3d
365, 370 (2015); Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 717, 390 P.3d at 443. A post-conviction applicant
establishes that his attorney provided deficient performance by proving the representation fell
below an objective standard ofreasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Wurdemann, 161
Idaho at 717, 390 P.3d at 443; McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010).
Although the post-conviction applicant faces a strong presumption that counsel was
competent and diligent in his or her representation of the defendant, counsel's "strategic and
tactical decisions" justify relief when the decision resulted from inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. McKay v. State,
148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010); State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123,
136 (2008). Ultimately, courts evaluate attorney performance under an objective reasonableness
standard under prevailing professional norms. Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 717, 390 P.3d at 443;

State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999).
To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is defined as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome. The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable."
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Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386,418, 348 P.3d
1, 33 (2015)
1.

Counsel's ineffective assistance prejudiced Robert's fundamental right to
testify in his own defense under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution

The evening of the first day of trial, Robert was pepper-sprayed and arrested on an
unrelated incident. Trial Transcript, p. 238, In. 5-20; p. 239, ln.3-6. The following morning,
Robert appeared in court with neither sleep nor his medication. Trial Transcript, p. 238, In. 5-20;
p. 239, ln.3-6; see also R. 524. By the third day of trial, the jail had still refused to administer
Robert's pain and anti-anxiety medication and he was suffering acute withdrawal. After the lunch
recess, trial counsel requested that the district allow Robert to take some of his medication,
stating: "Mr. Jimenez has indicated to me, Your Honor, that with regard to the med issue, the
medicine issue, he's asking him to be allowed to take the methadone, the half of methadone that
he took yesterday. He's starting to lose balance. It's impacting his ability to testify." Trial
Transcript, p. 530, In. 6-11. Robert addressed the Court: "Your Honor, I've tried to avoid it all
morning long. I've gone all morning avoiding it. I wouldn't be asking. I know it's a problem."
Trial Transcript, p. 531, ln.16-19. The district court determined it would conclude Robert's
testimony before allowing Robert to be seen by the jail's medical staff to determine if the
medication could be administered. Trial Transcript, p. 531, ln.20-24.
After Robert testified, the district court excused the jury and made the following record:
I am well aware that Mr. Jimenez has had medication, that he has been prescribed
medication. I'm well aware that he is in custody and has been in custody since Tuesday
night as a result of the new charges that we are all aware of. I have observed him testify
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on the stand. I will -- I do conclude that he is experiencing some level of pain 'cause I
can see it in his face from time to time, but with regard to the last testimony that just
occurred, I do not find any significant change in his demeanor or his ability to think or
answer [the prosecutor's] questions beyond that which was-- he was experiencing
throughout the rest of his testimony.
Trial Transcript, p. 535, In. 8-18. The district court called the jail nursing director as a witness
and the following exchange occurred:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Okay. Is the jail currently prescribing or giving to him any medication?
Yes.
What type of medication?
We are at this time giving him a blood medication and also a medication for his
diabetes.

Q:
A:
Q:

Okay. Are you aware that he has been prescribed any other medication?
No.
Has anybody tendered to the jail or brought to the jail either methadone,
oxycodone, or any other type of drug, requesting that he be given that
medication?
Yes. His girlfriend or someone had been contacting Dick's Pharmacy.

A:

Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:

Are you familiar with those three medications?
Yes.
And do any of those medications cause -- what's the purpose of those
medications, as far as you know, for this defendant? Pain control?
They're narcotic medications. Methadone is used for pain control. The other,
oxycodone, is used for pain control, and alprazolam is used for anxiety.
And given the prescribed doses, if you know this, if you don't, then please tell
me, are those prescribed doses, if given to the defendant in this case, likely to
affect his concentration or ability to participate in this trial?
I'm not a physician, but I -- so it would just be my opinion.
And what would that opinion be?
That it would affect him.

Trial Transcript, p. 539, ln.11 - p. 540, ln.2. Robert testified:
I've been on the medicine for a long time. I've been on it for a long, long time, and over
two years. I've been on the methadone for over a year. I've been on oxycodone for over
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three years. I was -- I'm the one that asked to be taken off the oxycodone, I used to be on
another one. I asked to be taken off it because I didn't like the way it was making me
feel, and I stopped taking the methadone after a while. I thought I was better, I thought it
was something that would go away. When I stopped, I ended up going into a seizure and
ended up going back into the hospital. I was then informed by the doctor that I can't stop
it right away, that's why I kept getting sick. You can't stop it right away. Everything's
been blurry. I can hold it, but barely. The ground feels like it's going to fall. I'll try to
hold out for the sake of the jury and my family sitting behind me, but everything is
getting blurry, my head's starting to get really bad. My back's been hurting me since this
morning ... It's getting to where I'm having a hard time focusing, and I've been trying
to avoid -- I've been trying all day, all day yesterday. And it's something that you're not
-- you can't just stop. You have to be tapered off it.
Trial Transcript, p. 543, ln.25 - p.544, ln.24. Shortly thereafter, the Court was informed by the
bailiff that Petitioner's medication was available, to which the Court responded, "Well, then, that
solves the problem." Trial Transcript, p. 54 7, ln.13-16.
A criminal defendant's right to testify in his own behalf, which is even more fundamental
than the right to self-representation, stems from his rights to call favorable witnesses as protected
under the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause and his opportunity to be heard in his
own defense as protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requirement
that a criminal defendant be given an and logically includes the right of an accused, under the
Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause, to call favorable witnesses. Rock v. Arkansas,
483 U.S. 44, 51-52 (1987); United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2000); see also

State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 904, 912, 908 P.2d 1211, 1219 (1995); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho
599, 603-04, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152-53 (2009); Kuehl v. State, 145 Idaho 607, 611, 181 P.3d 533,
537 (Ct. App. 2008). The right to testify on his own behalf is even more fundamental than the
right to self-representation. Rock, 483 U.S. at 51-52; Ferrarini, 219 F.3d at 152.
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Here, despite opiate withdrawal and pain, trial counsel failed to seek a continuance,
mistrial or otherwise address the violation to Robert's fundamental right to testify. In concluding
trial counsel was not ineffective, the district court focused on trial counsel's claim Robert did not
complain to him and that he seemed able to assist in his own defense. R. 526. The district court
noted Robert was "coherent" and wrote notes to trial counsel without problem.
However, the rights to testify, to be present, and to assist in the preparation of one's
defense have separate and distinct sources, scopes and purposes and the fact that a defendant has
the physical capacity to be present at trial and to assist his defense counsel does not necessarily
mean that he is also capable of testifying. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d at 152. The right to testify stems
from the due process requirement that a criminal defendant be given an opportunity to be heard
in his defense and logically includes the right of an accused, under the Sixth Amendment's
Compulsory Process Clause, to call favorable witnesses. Rock, 483 U.S. at 51-52; Ferrarini, 219
F.3d at 152. Conversely, the constitutional right to be present at trial is more circumscribed and
obtains only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by the defendant's
absence. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987); Ferrarini, 219 F.3d at 152. Although the
privilege of presence is not guaranteed when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a
shadow but there is no similar limitation on the right to testify, that is, a criminal defendant
enjoys the constitutional right to testify even when to do so would not be useful. Ferrarini, 219
F.3d at 152. The district court's generic conclusion that the defendant is physically able to
proceed to trial cannot satisfy the obligation to find whether the defendant had the capacity to
testify. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d at 152.
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Robert was suffering opiate withdrawal during his testimony in a trial that hinged on the
jury's determination whether he or his brother were telling the truth. Regardless of whether
Robert was seemingly coherent and able to pass notes, his condition certainly effected his
testimony in ways that cannot be quantified. Moreover, the condition was easily remedied by
insisting the trial be continued until Robert's medical condition was addressed. Indeed, the
solution was eventually implemented, too late to save Robert's chance to make impress with the
jury. The district court erred in denying Robert's petition for post-conviction relief.
2.

Counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress

A critical inquiry in determining whether counsel provided ineffective assistance for
failing to file a motion is whether the motion, if filed, should have been granted. Wurdemann,
161 Idaho at 717-18, 390 P.3d at 443--44; State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345,385,313 P.3d 1, 41
(2013); Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 579, 976 P.2d 927, 933 (1999). Once the court
determines a motion should have been granted, the petitioner must show the decision not to file
the meritorious motion was within the wide range of permissible discretion and trial strategy.
Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 717-18, 390 P.3d at 443--44.
Here, counsel failed to move to suppress Robert's statements taken during police
questioning at gunpoint. Miranda rights arise when the interviewee is subjected to custodial
interrogation. State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992).
"Custody" refers to a situation where a person's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree
associated with formal arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); State v. Myers,
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118 Idaho 608, 610, 798 P.2d 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1990). Fidelity to the doctrine announced in

Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly in those types of situations in which the concerns
that powered the decision are implicated. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 514 (2012
Here, trial counsel testified that he did not file a motion to suppress because the officer's
testimony conflicted as to whether "the defendant was under custodial arrest for purposes of
Miranda, or whether the defendant was simply being detained for investigative purposes." R.
540. The district court concurred, concluding a motion would not have been successful because
Robert was "lawfully" detained. R. 542.
However, the "determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the
interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the
person being questioned." Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318,323 (1994) (emphasis added).
To determine whether a suspect is in custody, the relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in
the suspect's position would have understood his or her situation. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442;

Myers, 118 Idaho at 611, 798 P.2d at 456. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
relevant factors include the following: "the location, timing, and length of the interview, the
nature and tone of the questioning, whether the defendant came to the place of questioning
voluntarily, the use of physical contact or physical restraint, and the demeanor of all of the key
players, both during the interview and in any proceedings held in court." Thompson v. Keohane,
516 U.S. 99, 118 (1995); State v. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307,313,324 P.3d 1006, 1012 (Ct. App.
2014); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440.
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Whether the officers believed Robert was subject to custodial interrogation was irrelevant
and trial counsel's decision to not file a motion based on a misunderstanding of the law was
objectively unreasonable. Moreover, held at gunpoint, Robert's freedom of movement was
curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest and a motion to suppress should have been
granted. Regardless of whether Robert made a similar statement to a 911 operator, his statement
to law enforcement undoubtedly impacted the jury in a case that turned entirely on Robert's
credibility.

3.

Trial counsel's failure to adequately cross-examine Jorge and otherwise
present impeaching evidence could not be considered sound strategic
decisions and individually and cumulatively prejudiced the result

Trial counsel failed to adequately cross-examine Jorge regarding statements he made
concerning the argument; Jorge's inconsistent statements about who shot him; and (3) that he
lied about having a concealed weapon's permit. R. 532-33. Trial counsel had varying rationales
for failing to introduce such evidence, including that the "primary defense" was not what Jorge
said but whether he exited his vehicle with his gun drawn. it. R. 534-35. In his closing argument,
Robert detailed each short-coming, how it was objectively unreasonable and impacted the
outcome. R. 482-488. The district court did not individually consider these arguments but simply
rubber-stamped counsel's explanations as untouchably "strategic."
However, state courts are not to indulge post hoc rationalization for counsel's decisionmaking that contradicts the available evidence of counsel's actions. Richter, 562 U.S. at 109;
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526-27 (2003). For the reasons argued to the district court, trial
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counsel's decisions revealed shortcomings capable of an objective evaluation and objectively
unreasonable.
Moreover, even if these shortcomings or the prejudice from the ineffective assistance of
counsel discussed above were not individually prejudicial, they combined to deprive Robert of
his constitutional right to a fair trial. Under the cumulative error doctrine, an accumulation of
irregularities, each of which might be harmless in itself, may in the aggregate reveal the absence
of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's right to due process. State v. Abdullah, 158
Idaho 386, 449, 348 P.3d 1, 64 (2015); Adams v. State, 161 Idaho 485, 500, 387 P.3d 153, 168
(Ct. App. 2016); Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396,421, 327 P.3d 372, 397 (Ct. App. 2013),
disapproved in later proceedings sub nom. Stevens v. Carlin, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1092 (D. Idaho
2018).
No reasonable trial strategy could explain trial counsel's failure to cross-examine Jorge
on critical issues at trial where the entire defense rested on his claim of self-defense. Trial
counsel was deficient by failing to raise the key issues to support Robert's defense and such
deficiency individually and cumulatively prejudiced Robert.

C.

Newly Discovered Mitigating Evidence
Section 19--4901 (a)(4) provides for post-conviction relief where the applicant

demonstrates that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that
requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice. This provision does not
afford an opportunity for resentencing based upon changes in the offender's character, health, or
mental condition occurring after the pronouncement of sentence which may, in hindsight, make
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the sentence appear more lengthy than necessary. Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 441, 163 P.3d
222, 230 (Ct. App. 2007); Bure v. State, 126 Idaho 253, 254, 880 P.2d 1241, 1242 (Ct. App.
1994). An applicant must present evidence of facts that existed at the time of sentencing that
would have been relevant to the sentencing process and that indicate the information available to
the parties or the trial court at the time of sentencing was false, incomplete, or otherwise
materially misleading. Bure, 126 Idaho at 254-55, 880 P.2d at 1242--43; See also Vick v. State,
131 Idaho 121,125,952 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Ct. App. 1998); Knutsen, 144 Idaho 433,440, 163 P.
3d at 229.
At the time of sentencing, the only documentation regarding Robert's mental health status
was contained within one paragraph of a one-page letter from the Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare. R. 481. Shortly after sentencing, a neuropsychological evaluation conducted for a
federal sentencing revealed mental health issues including post-traumatic stress disorder and
attention deficit disorder. Id.
This neuropsychological evaluation reveals that the information provided to the
sentencing court was incomplete and omitted critical information that would have impacted the
district court's sentencing determination. Robert was entitled to post-conviction relief based on
newly discovered evidence and the district court erred in denying his application for postconviction relief.
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IV. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated above, the district court erred in denying Robert's petition for
post-conviction relief. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's judgment and
remand with instruction to grant his requested relief.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of August, 2019.
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